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Evidence of Innocence Offered by The
Criminal Defendant: "Not So Fast";
Response
"If you can think about something that is inextricably attached to
something else without thinking about that to which it is attached,
you have a legal mind."
"Bull" Warren
PROFESSOR KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR.
The three provocative papers presented in this portion of the Sym-
posium challenge the increasing bureaucratization of criminal trials-a
trend the authors rightly see as a move away from the adversarial system
the Founders wrote into the Sixth Amendment of the United States Con-
stitution' and toward the inquisitorial system that they rejected.2 These
papers also nicely illustrate both the benefits and limitations of "juris-
prudential Fordism,"3 the reductionist mode of analysis favored by those
judges and scholars still under the sway of the progressive procedural
paradigm.4 My response will vamp on these two themes.5
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. See generally 30 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 6347 (1997) [hereinafter 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM].
3. I use the term "Fordism" because Henry Ford can be blamed for the assembly line method
of making cars. The assembly line provides a useful metaphor for the specialization of legal
academics, who, like Ford, can provide you with any color jurisprudence you want-"as long as it
is black."
4. "Reductionism" analyzes natural phenomena by breaking them down into smaller and
smaller parts. For example, human beings can be reduced to their bodies, their bodies to organs,
the organs to cells, the cells to chemicals, the chemicals into atoms, the atoms into subatomic
particles, and so on. Similarly, the law can be divided into substance and procedure, procedure
can be divided into civil and criminal procedure, procedure can be divided between trials and pre-
trial procedures, trials can be divided between evidence and argument, evidence can be reduced to
a series of rules, and each rule can be broken down into elements; for example, hearsay can be
defined by three elements-(I) a statement; (2) made out of court; and (3) offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted therein.
Despite its successes in the physical sciences, reductionism cannot work with every natural
phenomenon. Hence, some scientists have turned to its antithesis-often called "holism"-to
explain those dynamic processes that are inadequately captured by reductionist analysis. The
question posed here is whether holistic analysis might be a useful supplement to reductionism in
legal analysis.
5. I comment on the papers in the drafts that were presented at the Symposium. If my
comments are wide of the mark, the reader can suppose this is because the papers have been
edited since my comments were prepared, rather than inferring that I am unusually obtuse.
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1. POLYGRAPH AND REPRESSED MEMORY EVIDENCE
OFFERED BY AN ACCUSED
This paper comprehensively describes the admissibility of two
types of evidence offered by the defense that are sometimes thought of
as pro-prosecution evidence: first, evidence that a polygraph expert
thinks a witness is telling the truth or lying; and, second, testimony
about events that the witness could not recall until her memory was
stimulated by hypnosis or psychiatric intervention.
Polygraph or "lie detector" evidence has a comparatively lengthy
history of evidentiary exclusion with a fairly straightforward doctrinal
basis.6 During the regime of "precedential relevance" that preceded
modern codification, polygraph evidence birthed the so-called "Frye
rule" barring the admissibility of "novel scientific evidence" until the
proponent could convince the court that the technique used to generate
the evidence was accepted as legitimate by some relevant scientific com-
munity.' Despite massive propaganda efforts by the polygraph industry
and its business and government clientele, throughout the twentieth cen-
tury most courts held that the polygraph flunked the "Frye test" and,
therefore, was not admissible in the absence of a stipulation by the
parties.8
As Ms. Bessent correctly points out, in 1975, Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 402 repealed the doctrine of precedential relevance by stating that
relevant evidence could only be excluded if exclusion was required by
constitutional provision, statutory enactment, or some rule adopted
through the United States Supreme Court's rulemaking authority.9
Since polygraph evidence satisfies the minimal standard of relevance in
Federal Rule of Evidence 401, it became admissible because no consti-
tutional provision, federal statute, or Supreme Court rule made it inad-
missible.' ° While a few state and federal courts honored Rule 402 and
admitted polygraph evidence, most judges refused to give up the power
to create or enforce their own rules of evidence even after the Supreme
Court made it clear in 1993 that Rule 402 meant what it said.''
6. See generally 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5169 (1978) [hereinafter 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM].
7. See id.
8. NORMAN ANSLEY, ADMISSIBILITY OF POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL
CASES (1978).
9. See generally 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5192.
10. Perhaps in some cases, exclusion might be justified by Federal Rule of Evidence 403 or
because the person administering the polygraph did not possess the required expertise under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
II. New Mexico was first state to hold polygraph evidence admissible under a state version
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. State v. Dorsey, 539 P.2d 204 (N.M. 1975). Later N.M. R.
Evlo. 707 was adopted to regulate the use of polygraph evidence.
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Unfortunately, in the infamous Daubert case, the United States
Supreme Court held that the Frye doctrine had been repealed by Rule
402, and then turned around and read a much more expansive version of
Frye into Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which governs expert testi-
mony. 12 As documented by Ms. Bessent, most courts have used the
Neo-Frye doctrine to exclude defense polygraph evidence.1 3 In the
absence of statutory or rulemaking intervention, defense counsel are left
with the argument that exclusion of defense polygraph evidence violates
some constitutional provision.1 4 Though Ms. Bessent makes a brave
attempt to limit or distinguish it, most courts are likely to believe that
the Supreme Court resolved this question against the defense in Scheffer
v. United States.'
5
Except for the frequent assumption that it usually favors the prose-
cution, what Ms. Bessent calls "repressed memory evidence" differs
from polygraph evidence in almost every other particular. 6 "Repressed
memory evidence" is a more recent development, arising from the hyste-
ria about child sexual abuse that swept the country in the late twentieth
century.' 7 Moreover, the doctrinal basis for exclusion of such evidence
is far from clear, which may be why Ms. Bessent spends little time dis-
cussing it. 8 For purposes of my analysis, it may be helpful to distin-
guish between: (a) hypnotically refreshed recollection-where the
witness had to undergo hypnosis in order to recall the events she now
wants to testify about; and (b) psychiatrically refreshed recollection-
where consulting with a mental health professional sufficed to trigger
recollection without the use hypnosis.
Psychiatrically refreshed recollection seems admissible under mod-
12. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); see generally 22 WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5168.1 (Supp. 2001).
13. Yvette Bessent, Comment, Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence and Repressed Memory
Evidence When Offered by the Accused, 55 U. MtAMI L. REV. 975 (2001).
14. For an early assessment of this ploy, see Paul Thomas, Comment, Compulsory Process
and Polygraph Evidence: Does Exclusion Violate a Criminal Defendant's Due Process Rights?,
12 CONN. L. REV. 324 (1980). But see McMorris v. I. Israel, 643 F.2d 458 (7th Cir. 1981)
(holding that a prosecutor's refusal to stipulate to admissibility for solely tactical reasons violated
due process).
15. 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
16. Perhaps most salient is its narrower scope. Where virtually any witness could in theory
be subjected to a polygraph test, only a handful of witnesses will require the retrieval of repressed
memories.
17. California, as it frequently does, may have led the nation in overreacting. One need not
take a position on the guilt or innocence of the defendants in the infamous McMartin Pre-School
case to believe that school board rules barring high school football coaches from whacking players
on the buttocks when sending them into the game will do little to prevent victimization of children
by pedophiles. See McMartin v. County of Los Angeles, 202 Cal. App. 3d 848, 852-53 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1988).
18. Bessent, supra note 13, at 1006-10.
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em codes, as it would have been at common law.' 9 The witness can
testify to the refreshed recollection without revealing how she came by
her present recollection.2° On cross-examination, the precise manner by
which she was enabled to recall the events she is testifying to can be put
before the jury for purposes of attacking her credibility.2 ' Nothing in the
modem codes would prevent her from testifying merely because the
memory was only recently retrieved.22 In those few states where courts
retain their common law powers to create exclusionary rules, they could
create a rule barring psychiatrically refreshed recollection.23 But, in the
absence of expert testimony that psychiatrically refreshed recollection is
any worse than memory refreshed by any of the traditional methods,
how could the court justify such a rule?
24
Distinguish the question of whether or not the repression of mem-
ory suffices to toll the running of the statute of limitations. This is a
question of substantive law as to which the way in which the repressed
memory was retrieved is relevant only insofar as it may cast doubt on
the claim that the memory was truly lost, or that it could not have been
recalled earlier. The rules of evidence come into play only if the sub-
stantive statute of limitation turns on how the memory was retrieved.
Then the court could exclude repressed memory evidence only on the
ground that it was irrelevant. But, under Federal Rule of Evidence 104,
relevance is a question for the jury not the judge.
Hypnotically refreshed recollection, as Professor Gold has shown,
differs greatly.26 Scientists have reached no consensus on the nature of
hypnosis and disagree sharply on whether the memories produced
through hypnosis are "true" in the sense in which the law uses that
word.27 Courts agreeing with those who claim that hypnotically
19. The most famously expansive statement of the common law rule is Judge Frank's opinion
in Fanelli v. United States Gypsum Co., 141 F.2d 216, 217 (2d Cir. 1944). For a more recent
reiteration, see Baker v. State, 371 A.2d 699 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977).
20. The common law attitude permeates the so-called "restroom rule" that denied the
opponent access to the refreshing material so long as it triggered the recollection of the witness
when the witness was not on the stand. The "restroom rule" was partially repealed by FED. R.
EvID. 612.
21. For example, jurors who are not devotees of Proust may find the witness incredible if she
testifies on cross-examination that a flood of memories was triggered by a whiff of French pastry.
22. This is implicit in FED. R. EvID. 612.
23. Only a half-dozen states still have a common law system of evidence.
24. Perhaps it could be argued that hypnosis, like the polygraph test result, will be overvalued
by the jurors but we know of no evidence that this is likely.
25. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5166.
26. 27 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & VICTOR J. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
EVIDENCE § 6011 (1990) [hereinafter 27 WRIGHT & GRAHAM].




refreshed recollection is bogus may want to exclude it; the question is
how?
At common law, a court could hold that a witness whose recollec-
tion is hypnotically refreshed did not meet the mental requirements of
witness competency.28 Courts governed by Federal Rule of Evidence
601, however, cannot bar the testimony on this ground because Rule 601
repeals all the mental and moral qualifications for witnesses. 29 A more
promising ground is that a witness who can only recall through hypnosis
lacks "personal knowledge" required by Federal Rule of Evidence 602.30
This raises a number of interesting philosophical and scientific questions
about the nature of human perception and recollection, but forget those
questions for now.3' Whether or not a witness has "personal knowl-
edge" is a question for the jury under Rule 104 and 602.32 The judge
could exclude the testimony only by taking judicial notice that the hyp-
notically refreshed recollection is bogus, but given the split in the scien-
tific community, Federal Rule of Evidence 20111 would present a serious
obstacle to this technique.34 The court could also hold that as a matter of
law a person who recalls only after hypnosis lacks personal knowledge,
but this would plunge the court into the philosophical and scientific
quandaries just passed over.
Judges desperate enough to adopt a fanciful route to exclusion
could portray the previously hypnotized witness as an automaton-a
machine like the polygraph.35 The court could then invoke the Frye
Rule or the Neo-Frye Rule and hold that given the split in the scientific
28. At common law, all four of the testimonial assumptions-that is, the ability to perceive,
recollect, and narrate sincerely-were included in the notion of competence. See CAL. EVID.
CODE § 701 comment. Hence, a court could hold that a witness requiring hypnotic refreshment
did not have a legally sufficient memory.
29. The mere fact that the doctrine of incompetence has been repealed has not stopped some
courts from holding hypnotically refreshed witnesses incompetent to testify. See 27 WRIGHT &
GOLD, supra note 26, § 6011, at 129.
30. Id. § 6023 at 204, § 6026, at 236.
31. At least for the moment. See infra text of note 51.
32. 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 26, § 6027.
33. Federal Rule of Evidence 201 (b) states: "KINDS OF FACTS. A judicially noticed fact must
be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the
territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." FED. R. EvID. 201(b).
34. 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5106 (1977) [hereinafter 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM].
35. Readers who think this is farfetched should consult the psuedo-science of "evolutionary
psychology," which uses genetic determinism to justify all human behavior from rape to the
Holocaust. See, e.g., RANDY THORNHILL & CRAIG T. PALMER, A NATURAL HISTORY OF RAPE:
BIOLOGICAL BASES OF SEXUAL COERCION (2000) and a devastating review thereof, Jerry A. Coyne
& Andrew Berry, Rape as An Adaptation: Is This Contentious Hypothesis Advocacy, Not
Science?, 404 NATURE 121 (Mar. 9, 2000).
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community, the reliability of the hypnotically powered "witness
machine" has not gained the requisite level of scientific reliability.36 A
less exotic tool for exclusion is Federal Rule of Evidence 403; a court
might hold that allowing a hypnotically refreshed witness to testify
would open the door to a battle of the experts over the credibility of such
testimony, a battle the jury would be ill-equipped to resolve.3 7 This
approach, however, requires the court to give the hypnotically refreshed
testimony very low probative value; a difficult step if the witness will
provide direct evidence of a consequential fact in the case because the
probative worth of direct evidence must be near the maximum and the
credibility of the witness is not supposed to enter into Rule 403
balancing.38
In short, if the court honestly applies the modern evidence statutes
it will find few grounds for excluding the testimony of a witness whose
recollection has been refreshed either by psychiatric intervention or by
hypnosis. 39  Hence, unlike polygraph evidence, the exclusion of
"repressed memory evidence" is suspect without reaching constitutional
questions. Nonetheless, revisiting those constitutional questions may
open a "wormhole" into that remote part of evidentiary outer space we
have previously passed over.4  Recall that in Rock v. Arkansas4 the
Court held that a criminal defendant had a constitutional right to testify
with a hypnotically refreshed memory, but in United States v. Scheffer42
the Court held that a defendant did not have a constitutional right to
introduce the opinion of a polygrapher that he was telling the truth when
he testified. Given the comparative reliability of the two kinds of evi-
dence, how can these opinions be reconciled?
The Legal Realist has an easy answer. "The Court" is a fiction; one
36. Courts would have to use the machine analogy because, as explained above, the
hypnotically refreshed witness can testify without revealing how her recollection was refreshed.
If expert witnesses were called to testify about the reliability, or lack thereof, of hypnotically
refreshed recollection, the Neo-Frye doctrine could be applied without resort to the mechanical
metaphor.
37. 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 26, § 6011, at 135.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Gatto, 924 F.2d 491, 500 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding eyewitness
testimony so probative that it cannot be outweighed by hypnosis or suggestive questioning).
39. I do not mean to suggest that every judge who excludes such evidence must act
dishonestly. Desperation drives some judges to readings of the evidence rules they might reject in
calmer moments. A few judges may be stupid enough to honestly believe that exclusion can be
justified under the rules. Once the desperate and the ill-informed constitute a majority on some
appellate court, honest judges may feel compelled to follow precedents whose reasoning they
doubt.
40. Readers not conversant with the astronomical worldview of the "Star Trek" television
series need only know that a "wormhole" is an anomaly in space-time that enables space travellers
to go "farther out" into space than might be possible using conventional modes of travel.
41. 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
42. 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
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of the cases was decided by a "bleeding heart liberal" majority and the
second was decided by a group of "law-and-order conservatives." Con-
stitutional lawyers and scholars cannot accept the Realist account
because this would suggest that the Court is a political body and thus
endanger its "legitimacy. 43 Hence, we must cook up doctrinal reasons
to explain this political stew.
One jurisprudential explanation for the schizophrenic decisions
invokes the Court's mode of analysis. In the Rock case, the majority of
the Court followed a non-reductionist analysis to apply what has been
called "the holistic Sixth." 4 The Compulsory Process Clause45 at first
looks most apt in giving the previously hypnotized defendant the right to
testify. It looks less promising, however, when we recall-as the Rock
majority concedes-that until very late in the nineteenth century, when
the Sixth Amendment had been in effect for nearly a century, criminal
defendants were not allowed to testify at all in federal courts. So, the
Rock majority conjured up the right of previously hypnotized defendants
to testify by combining the Compulsory Process Clause, the Due Process
Clause4 6 and the Fifth Amendment47 into a right to a "fair adversary
trial" in which reliability of the evidence was only one of the
ingredients.48
By contrast, the dissent in Rock and the majority in Scheffer used
the reductionist analysis of the Sixth Amendment that has dominated
interpretation of that amendment for well over a hundred years.
49
According to this analysis, the purpose of the evidence clauses of the
Sixth Amendment is solely to ensure that the jury verdict is "right" by
testing evidence for its "reliability" and excluding any evidence likely to
mislead the jury or to interfere with the goal of maximizing punishment.
(Though not strictly relevant to the present point, we may note that the
historical evidence tends to show that the Founders intended something
like "the holistic Sixth"-an adversary system that they characterized as
"trial by jury" in opposition to the inquisitorial systems used on the
43. In the wake of the recent election controversy resulting in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000), even respected constitutional law scholars from prestigious Eastern universities have
publicly admitted that the function of so-called "Constitutional Law" is to preserve the legitimacy
of the Supreme Court's exercise of political power. See Charles Fried, A Badly Flawed Election:
An Exchange, N.Y. REV. BKS., Feb. 22, 2001, at 8, 9 (".. .we should not jeopardize [the Supreme
Court's] legitimacy out of anger at one apparently indefensible decision.")
44. 30A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 6366 (2000).
45. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
48. Rock, 483 U.S. at 51 ('The right to testify on one's own behalf at a criminal trial has
sources in several provisions of the Constitution").
49. 30 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 2, § 6341.
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European continent.)51
The contrast between these two approaches may be illustrated by
reversing the usual metaphor." Suppose for a moment that we treat my
computer as a person. If we follow Sigmund Freud,52 the computer's
memory is the "ego," I am the "super-ego," and the hardware and
software are its "id." Assume that one day when I hit on WestlawTM the
computer "id," as it is wont to do, errs and takes me instead to a kiddy
porn site.53 I, as the "superego," immediately repress this "memory" by
deleting the kiddy porn. Assume further that the FBI is running the
kiddy porn site to track pedophiles, that agents descend on my home
with a search warrant, and cart off the computer to the FBI Crime Lab.
There an expert, using a readily available commercial program, is able
to reconstruct the "erased memory." If you see the FBI expert as a met-
aphor for the hypnotherapist in Rock, you are way ahead of me.
If I were prosecuted for possession of kiddy porn, I might defend
by arguing that the computer the government wants to introduce into
evidence is not "my" computer, but rather a different computer con-
structed by the FBI crime lab. "My computer"-the one seized from
me-had no memory of the kiddy porn and thus I could not have pos-
sessed it. If the reader has followed this contrived analogy, she will
appreciate that we have now returned to those difficult philosophical and
theoretical issues that we previously passed over; namely, is the knowl-
edge that Mrs. Rock possesses only by virtue of hypnotic intervention
really "her" personal knowledge?
To put the point more prosaically, does the previously hypnotized
witness really "recall" the repressed memory or is her recall something
reconstructed by the hypnotist from traces in her mind? At trial, presum-
ably no longer under hypnosis, does she now recall the event or does she
simply recall what she said about the event under hypnosis? If the latter,
are we now to regard her testimony as a species of "hearsay"-she is
telling us what she told the hypnotist while in a trance? (If so, this may
explain the Court's reluctance to extend the Rock doctrine to witnesses
other than the defendant; e.g., witnesses for the prosecution. The defen-
dant's confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment are more robust
than the prosecution's under the Due Process Clause.) Hearsay or not,
how is the prosecution able to cross-examine her?54 Presumably, just as
50. Id. § 6348.
51. That is, instead of using the human mind as a metaphor for the computer, we shall use the
computer as a metaphor for the human mind.
52. See SIGMUND FREUD, THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS (Joyce Crick trans., Oxford
University Press 1999).
53. This is a purely hypothetical event.
54. 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 26, § 6011, at 148.
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the FBI expert who reconstructed my computer's "memory" had little
interest in searching for the error that placed the kiddy porn there or for
evidence of my prompt suppression of that memory, so the defense hyp-
notist is unlikely to seek recall of memories not helpful to the defense."
But, if we push the computer analogy farther, we may find other
grounds in the "holistic Sixth" to support the Rock majority. The Con-
frontation Clause gives the defendant a right to be "present" at trial.56
But who is "the defendant"? Is it the "Mrs. Rock" who was indicted and
has no recollection of the exculpatory evidence or the "Mrs. Rock" who
now recalls her innocence? If the purpose of "presence" is only to allow
the defendant to assist the lawyer in her defense, and not to make her
available to counter prosecution evidence, then the dissent has a stronger
case.57 But, from the perspective of the "holistic Sixth," her "presence"
serves functions other than providing evidence. Her presence under the
Confrontation Clause adds to the function of the indictment in allowing
her to see not only "the nature and cause" of the accusation but the
evidence that supports the jury finding of guilt. Imagine for a moment
the somewhat different view of the trial and verdict that would be held
by the Mrs. Rock who did not recall her innocence with the response of
the one who does recall-and knows that she was not allowed to present
her version of "the truth."
By projecting ourselves into these seemingly esoteric and theoreti-
cal questions, we can eventually reach the point where substance and
procedure merge.58 Which Mrs. Rock do we punish: the one who recalls
or the one who does not? Had Mrs. Rock committed her crime while in a
hypnotic trance, we would have some misgivings about punishing her
for the crime of murder. Part of that misgiving stems from a visceral
feeling that the "Mrs. Rock" in a trance is not the "Mrs. Rock" who is to
be held responsible. Without positing equivalence, I suggest that similar
misgivings ought to arise when we try one "Mrs. Rock" as if she were
the other one.
By tweaking the metaphor a bit, we can also shed light on the poly-
graph cases. In both hypnotic memory refreshment and polygraph anal-
ysis, the defendant is being used as an instrument for the creation of
55. Courts might impose an obligation on the prosecution to seek out such memories by
analogy to the procedures used in lineups-another instance of prosecution construction of
evidence.
56. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
57. Compare with Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975).
58. This appears to be the point at which reductionism began. The blurring of the distinction
between substance and procedure occurs with increasing frequency; e.g., under Federal Rule of
Evidence 413, where under the guise of altering the Federal Rules of Evidence the United States
Congress has moved the substantive law in the direction of punishing the accused for being a
rapist, rather than for committing a particular rape.
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evidence that lies below the level of her awareness. 59 In one case mem-
ories that have been repressed, and in the other case involuntary auto-
nomic responses. Apparently if the hypnotist can construct a false
memory, the polygrapher will be unable to deconstruct it. The defen-
dant's autonomic responses do not constitute "testimony against" her
such that their use would violate the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.60 But, on the other hand, neither are they "hearsay" as that term is
commonly defined. 6' Nonetheless, as was the case with hypnotically
induced testimony, the ability of the opponent to "cross-examine" the
defendant about this "non-testimony" will be hampered, because it must
be done through an expert likely to be adverse to the opponent and more
skilled than the defendant in evading cross-examination that would
impair the probative worth of the evidence the expert has created.
2. DEFENDANT'S PROFFERED EVIDENCE THAT A THIRD PERSON
COMMITTED THE CRIME: SATISFYING THE
"LEGITIMATE TENDENCY" TEST
Except for the rule that innocence is not a ground for habeas corpus
relief,6" probably no legal doctrine seems more perverse to the non-law-
yer than the rule in many states that bars criminal defendants from mak-
ing "the Perry Mason defense."63 Lawyers may find it amusing that
ordinary folk suppose that, like the fictional lawyer of television fame,
they can exculpate their clients at the preliminary hearing by proving
that another person committed the charged crime. But perhaps we ought
59. Hence, in each case the defendant's autonomy is being impaired. Where the defendant
consents to this, courts may find it acceptable. But, were concerns about the adversary position of
the prosecutor to lead courts in the direction of giving the prosecution the power to use the
defendant as an involuntary instrument of evidence against him, notions of party autonomy
submerged in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments would surface quicker than a Polaris missile.
60. Compare United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975) with Hester v. City of
Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492 (11 th Cir. 1985).
61. The autonomic responses would not constitute an "oral or written assertion" within the
meaning of FED. R. EvIo. 801(a)(I) nor nonverbal conduct intended as an "assertion" under FED.
R. EvID. 801(a)(2).
62. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
63. United States v. DeNoyer, 811 F.2d 436, 440 (8th Cir. 1987). The title refers to the
lawyer-hero of Earl Stanley Gardner's mystery novels, later a popular television series starring
Raymond Burr. Perry Mason, with the use of diligent detective work by Paul Drake and clever
cross-examination, was usually able to get his client discharged at the preliminary hearing by
proving that some other person committed the crime-an outcome as fictional fifty years ago as it
is today.
This defense is also called "the S.O.D.D.I. defense"-for "some other dude did it." See, e.g.,
Dennis Prater & Tammy M. Somogye, Some Other Dude Did It (But Will You Be Allowed To
Prove It?), J. KAN. B. Ass'N, May 1998, 28-29; see also, United States v. Olney, 892 F.2d 84 (9th
Cir. 1989). Because of its racial overtones, that title will not be used here. But see United States
v. Lively, 817 F. Supp. 453 (D. Del. 1993) (refusing to find racial implications in term).
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to more troubled than we are when legal rules depart from notions of
justice found elsewhere in our culture.
Even at common law, the cases barring the "Perry Mason defense"
until some higher than normal standard of relevance was met were diffi-
cult to defend.' The supposed "institutional disadvantage" of the prose-
cution appears ludicrous to anyone familiar with the state of criminal
justice in the twenty-first century when conviction rates are at an all-
time high in most states.65 As Wigmore has pointed out, if the kind of
mind it takes to be a judge is capable of seeing the flaws in the evidence,
there is no reason to suppose that jurors cannot see it as well.6 6 Finally,
it seems implausible to suggest that fabricating a case for the guilt of
another person is easier than fabricating an alibi or other evidence of
one's own innocence.
But now that most states have adopted some statute or rule like
Rule 402, cases barring evidence of third person guilt are indefensible.
67
As we saw in the previous section, Rule 402 abolishes the doctrine of
"precedential relevance," depriving courts of the common law power to
create new exclusionary rules of evidence.68 One can argue, as Mr.
Powell does, that in a few cases the codified character evidence rules
appears to bar some evidence of the guilt of another, but as he rightly
points out, given the free rein courts have given prosecutors under these
rules, it is difficult to defend applying a more stringent standard to the
defense. 69 Thus, after Daubert7 ° and similar cases, the Alexander dic-
tum" is not good law, even in federal courts, and thus a far less persua-
sive authority for state judges.72 But, as Mr. Powell demonstrates at
64. Particularly when that standard was higher than the one that the prosecution had to meet
to put the defendant on trial.
65. Brett Powell, Comment, Perry Mason meets the "Legitimate Tendency" Standard of
Admissibility (and doesn't like what he sees), 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1023 (2001) (mentioning
"institutional disadvantage."); see generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 460 (1993).
66. IA JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §139 at 1724 (Tillers rev. 1983).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Crenshaw, 698 F.2d 1060, 1064 (9th Cir. 1983); People v. Hall,
718 P.2d 99, 104 (Cal. 1986).
68. See infra text at note 9.
69. Powell, supra note 65, at 1047-51.
70. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (holding Federal Rule of
Evidence 402 repeals common law rules of exclusion).
71. See United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161 (8th Cir. 1975).
72. I am not as certain as Mr. Powell seems to be that the Alexander opinion had that much
influence in shaping the anti-Perry Mason rule in state courts. Most of the early cases I have read
seem to take the doctrine from a legal encyclopaedia rather than from the United States Supreme
Court. I also think that the shape of the doctrine is more diverse than might appear from Mr.
Powell's discussion. For my views, see the next supplement of 22 CHARLES A. WRIGHT &
KENNETH W. GRAHAM JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5180.1
(forthcoming in 2002).
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length, state courts, including those in my own state of California,73 treat
legislative rules of evidence as only slightly more authoritative than law
review articles.74
Thus, while I agree with Mr. Powell that the "holistic Sixth" gives
defendants a constitutional right to make the "Perry Mason defense," it
seems a bit like firing a cannonball at a gnat.75 If, as Mr. Powell says,
federalism is "admirable," then shouldn't we be insisting that state
courts follow the rules of evidence laid down in statutes and court
rules?76 This would not only save the Sixth Amendment for cases in
which there is no other remedy, but by getting state judges to take the
modern evidence statutes seriously it would have an effect far beyond
the cases that rightly draw Mr. Powell's fire.77
To do this requires us to understand just why it is that so many
judges feel that the modern evidence statutes are merely advisory.78
Power explains much of this. The Progressive Proceduralists, whose
ideas shaped much of the modern evidence statutes, favored increasing
the discretionary power of trial judges.79 Lawyers rightly saw that the
shift from fixed rules to discretionary ones would lessen their power and
were able to block reform until the discretion of the court was limited by
what is now Rule 403.80 What they failed to foresee was that appellate
judges, who also lose power to the trial court under a discretionary sys-
tem, were willing to forego that power if it would save them work.81
Thus, even when evidence opinions are not written by clerks, they tend
73. David A. Garcia, Third Party Culpability Evidence: A Criticism of the California
Mendez-Arline Exclusionary Rule-Toward a Constitutional Standard of Relevance and
Admissibility, 17 U.S.F. L. REV. 441 (1983).
74. See Powell, supra note 65.
75. Nonetheless, some courts have brushed off the constitutional claim. See, e.g., Watson v.
United States, 612 A.2d 179 (D.C. Ct. App. 1992); Keith v. State, 612 P.2d 977, 982 (Alaska
1980); State v. Thomas, 847 P.2d 1219, 1225 (Kan. 1993).
76. Powell, supra note 65, at 1056 (discussing federalism).
77. Remember that both of the other papers under discussion would not have been written had
courts not continued to apply rules that were supposedly repealed by Federal Rule of Evidence
402.
78. There are so many examples of this, it is hard to select the paradigm case. Let's take
Federal Rule of Evidence 601 because so many evidence scholars are complicit. That Rule
abolishes all forms of witness incompetence, except in cases where the Erie doctrine requires
federal courts to follow state law. The Rule could hardly be clearer: "[elvery person is competent
to be a witness." FED. R. EVID. 601. Yet, aided and abetted by the authors of the leading evidence
treatises, courts go on their merry way, disqualifying children and those with low mental skills as
if the United States Congress had never enacted FED. R. EvIo. 601. The shameful story is told in
27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 26, § 6005.
79. See generally Kenneth W. Graham, The Persistence of Progressive Proceduralism, 61
TEXAS L. REV. 929 (1983).
80. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5211.
81. Enforcing the rules of evidence ranks rather low on the agenda of most appellate courts.
An anonymous informant with personal knowledge once explained the low quality of the evidence
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to make every one of the Federal Rules of Evidence, not just Rule 403, a
matter for a wide, if not unchecked, discretion in the trial judge.82
Having gutted the statutory rules with the knife of discretion, when
appellate courts want to exercise power over trial courts, they are often
forced to resort to new exclusionary rules of their own making rather
than relying on the ones adopted through the rulemaking power.8 3 Thus,
we find courts reviving old common law doctrines supposedly repealed
by Rule 402-everything from competence of witnesses to "no
impeachment on a collateral matter." This does not seem to be what the
Progressive Proceduralists had in mind.84
Why courts want to continue enforcing the anti-Perry Mason doc-
trine is another matter.85 One possibility is that courts take a more holis-
tic view of the question.86 If we ask ourselves how many defendants
would be able to avail themselves of the Perry Mason defense if it were
more widely available, we may speculate that only wealthy defendants
like O.J. Simpson and the Menendez brothers will be able to hire private
detectives like Perry Mason's Paul Drake to hunt up evidence of the
guilt of another person.87 Or, courts may be more cynical than Mr. Pow-
ell, who seems to suppose that the purpose of the criminal justice system
is to discover the truth about the charged offense. A judge who thinks
that the purpose of the judicial system is to produce guilty pleas rather
opinions in one federal circuit by stating that most of the judges in that circuit let their clerks do
their evidence opinions so they could devote their time to "the really important stuff."
82. 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5166, at 45.1 (Supp. 2001).
83. Some scholars have accused the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence of
implicitly endorsing this practice by refusing to make amendments to the Rules that might meet
legitimate need for change and reduce the power of appellate courts to engage in illegitimate
lawmaking. See Paul R. Rice & Neals-Erik Deiker, The Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory
Committee: A Short History of Too Little Consequence, 191 F.R.D. 678 (2000). It is hardly
surprising that evidence scholars would want the river of reform to run through the Advisory
Committee since they can suppose that their influence is more strongly felt there than in appellate
courts.
84. Progressive Proceduralists, past and present, have been notoriously naive about matters of
judicial power. Perhaps, they actually believe that judges are not politicians in robes.
85. See discussion infra p. 1119 for another take on this.
86. That is, they look at evidence doctrine in the context of the criminal trial. Since evidence
teachers seldom emphasize the relationship between, say, the rules of criminal discovery and the
rules of evidence, it would be unfair to tax student authors for failing to think about how their
favoured reforms might play out in a criminal justice system that tends to resist, if not undermine,
procedural change.
87. The police have little interest in doing this and criminal discovery in most states and in
federal courts affords few tools by which defense lawyers can do this. Recent cases of wrongfully
convicted capital defendants has fixed the media's childlike attention span on the inadequate
defense afforded people of modest means, at least in supposedly benighted states like Texas and
Florida. But similar exposes would turn up equally scandalous practices in states that like to look
down their noses when they look across their borders. See, e.g., Jane Fritsch & David Rohde,
Legal Help Often Fails New York's Poor, NEW YORK TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at 1.
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than trials of truth, may apply 'Posnerian' reasoning to argue that if the
anti-Perry Mason rule prevents even the innocent from gaining acquit-
tals, this will encourage defendants who, like most of us, are guilty of
something (if not the charged crime) to accept the prosecutor's plea bar-
gain, rather than be convicted of some more serious crime and suffer
penalties disproportionate to their true guilt.
3. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY ON EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION IN COURTS
Calling psychological experts to testify about the pitfalls of eyewit-
ness identification both resembles and differs from the kinds of defense
evidence discussed in the previous two papers. Expert testimony on
eyewitness identification testimony, like polygraph evidence, is relevant
and meets the standards for the admissibility of expert testimony in Rule
702. Similarly, the exclusion of this evidence looks like another triumph
of precedential relevance over Rule 402; that is, many courts are simply
continuing to apply rules supposedly repealed by the Federal Rules of
Evidence.
But, unlike hypnotically refreshed testimony, the weaknesses of
eyewitness identifications have been so extensively established by sound
psychological science that expert testimony about them would seem
capable of meeting the Frye-Daubert doctrine.88 If this is true, it
appears that the defense's claim to a constitutional fight to introduce
expert testimony is stronger in the case of eyewitness identification than
in the case of hypnotically refreshed recollection. Moreover, testimony
about the weaknesses of eyewitness identification seems far more help-
ful to the jury than the evidence of bias that was held to be admissible
under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment in Davis v.
Alaska.89 Given the notorious fact that faulty eyewitness identifications
is one of the leading causes of erroneous convictions, the jury needs all
the help it can get in cases where eyewitness identification is
controverted.
The reasons given for exclusion of expert testimony on eyewitness
identification seem weak by comparison. Mr. Dillickrath rightly points
out the falsity of the claim that jurors are already aware of the psycho-
logical literature on eyewitness identification. 9° Moreover, if it were lit-
erally true that "everybody knows it," then presumably the court could
take judicial notice of this literature in determining what cross-examina-
88. Thomas Dillickrath, Comment, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification:
Admissibility and Alternatives, 55 U. MIAMI. L. REV. 1059 (2001).
89. 415 U.S. 408 (1974).
90. Dillickrath, supra note 88, at 1062.
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tion and jury arguments to allow and how it should instruct the jury and
comment on the evidence. Mr. Dillickrath suggests fear of a "rash of
unjust acquittals" as at least a subliminal cause for exclusion.9 But, the
constitutionally required burden of proof in criminal cases is supposed to
produce "unjust acquittals," especially with regard to evidence that has
been the cause of so many "unjust convictions."92
Power is a more likely explanation for judicial reluctance to admit
such evidence. As Mr. Dillickrath suggests, permitting expert testimony
on the weakness of eyewitness identification cedes control of the jury's
consideration of the probative worth of eyewitnesses from the judge to
the expert and from law to science. Furthermore, as in the case of other
kinds of evidence discussed above, it is a further example of the reluc-
tance of modern judges to expand the adversary system to encompass
psychological truth-hence, the notion that instructions to the jury are
an adequate substitute.
Judges may also fear for their ability to limit the principle support-
ing the admission of expert testimony on eyewitness identification-the
infamous "slippery slope" argument. The author seems to accept the
notion that similar experts could be called by the prosecution, though he
is rather vague on what their testimony might add. But, what about an
expert who wants to testify that this eyewitness's identification is true
(or false)? Or, suppose the defense wants to call an expert to testify
about the psychological weaknesses of excited utterances or lay opinions
of intoxication? These, too, are efforts to use science to undermine legal
rules and the power of judges.
In theory, the proposed substitutes for expert testimony on eyewit-
ness identification are plausible; in practice, they are unlikely to provide
an adequate substitute. The ability of the jurors to absorb the instruc-
tions thrown at them by the judge at the end of the case has long been
questioned and none of the instructions quoted in the Comment seems
adequate to attract the jury's attention and foster their understanding.93
Argument looks like a better solution, but how many lawyers will be
able to make a good argument without the assistance of an expert that
they cannot afford to hire, and that the judge is not required to obtain for
them?
Cross-examination is the traditional safeguard and in the hands of a
good lawyer may very well communicate more to the jury than the testi-
mony of an expert. One can imagine, as Mr. Dillickrath suggests, a
string of "were you aware that psychologists have found..." questions
91. Id.
92. 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 34, § 5142.
93. Dillickrath, supra note 88, at 1093-95.
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to bring the witness to a less confident opinion of her identification.
Indeed, one can propose an in-court line-up in which the over-confident
witness is asked to pick out the bailiff who called her in from the hall or
an investigator who came in to speak to defense counsel while she was
on the stand. But courts, like those in Los Angeles, that will not allow
defense counsel to test an officer's opinion that he saw "marijuana," by
asking him which bottle contains "marijuana" and which contains oreg-
ano, are not likely to sit still for such in-court testing of the ability of lay
witnesses.94
Judicial comment is another alternative suggested by Judge Easter-
brook's remarks. 95 Rather than have the judge read boilerplate instruc-
tions to the jury, we might ask judges to use the psychological insights
of the experts to comment specifically on the testimony of the eyewit-
nesses in the present case, highlighting those features that tend to detract
from the accuracy of the identification and those that may enhance it.
But, this requires judges as sensitive to the dangers of false identification
as they are sensitive to the interest of the state in punishment and to their
own interest in the size of their dockets.
4. SOME FINAL RUMINATIONS
Each of the three papers stands alone quite well. The standard
reductionist techniques serve well to dissect the reasoning of the courts
and expose inconsistencies, even fallacies, in judicial thinking. Reduc-
tionist thinking, however, falls short because of its inability to put the
cases and doctrines into a broader context. At one level, these separate
papers can all be seen as chapters in a book about the increasing
bureaucratisation of criminal justice, with its move away from the adver-
sarial system mandated by the Sixth Amendment toward an inquisitorial
system of the sort the Founders hated. At the very least, looking at the
cases in this broader panorama might have chastened the modest opti-
mism of the authors.
On the other hand, and perhaps perversely, a deeper view makes
these seemingly disparate doctrines more explicable, if not more justifia-
ble. In each of the papers, we see judges being asked to undermine one
or more of the basic assumptions of our system of trial evidence. The
notion that jurors are able to assess the reliability of direct evidence
without outside assistance is undermined by the psychological evidence
94. A better analogy may be the cases in which counsel brings in a actor or a relative to sit
next to her at the counsel table and reveals the true identity of the impostor after witnesses have
confidently identified him as the person they say commit the crime. This dramatic illustration of
the weakness of identification seems to be almost universally condemned by the courts.
95. Dillickrath, supra note 88, at 1097-99.
1116 [Vol. 55:1101
EVIDENCE OF INNOCENCE
on the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. The notion that human
memory is unitary and not subject to outside intervention becomes dubi-
ous if the repressed memory gurus are right. The concept of party
autonomy that is the bedrock of the adversary system is weakened, when
we accept the notion that conscious deception can be detected by an
examination of unconscious responses.
Though less clear, the case of the "Perry Mason defense" is the
most telling. As far back as Sherlock Holmes, detective stories have
featured bumbling police officers set right by amateur outsiders. The
lawyer who wants to present a "Perry Mason" defense conjures up this
cultural prejudice against constituted authority. Whether or not they are
consciously aware of this, courts that bar the defense defy this subver-
sive culture and strike a blow in favor of bureaucratic regularity. Con-
trary to the presumption of innocence, there is a presumption that if the
police and the prosecutor say that the defendant "did it," he did. Hence,
courts are going to insist that the defendant produce some evidence to
prove that the police erred before evidence of an alternative perpetrator
of the crime will be admitted.
This is admittedly a rather depressing picture. But, we should not
assume that the slide toward a bureaucratic system of criminal justice
runs downward from some Edenic past. Some of the participants in this
seminar can remember when the criminal justice system so celebrated
individual autonomy that criminal defendants could be convicted with-
out the assistance of counsel that was supposedly guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment. We have come some distance since then, and the
contributions of these student authors offers grounds for hope that the
future will look back at us, much as we look back at critics and apolo-
gists for the criminal justice system in the mid-twentieth century.
Watching these law students struggle to use reductionist analysis to
make sense of decisions that fly in the face of the announced values of
the law of evidence, ought to make law professors uneasy about the way
we teach the subject. By being less than realistic about criminal trials,
are we pointing our students down the short path from disillusionment to
cynicism?96
96. I hasten to add that one teacher's realism can be another teacher's cynicism. For example,
I think that rather than a single Daubert rule, there are in fact four; one for civil defendants,
another for prosecutors, another for civil plaintiffs, and a special rule for criminal defendants.
Yet, when I suggested at the Symposium that federal judges regularly admit "junk science"
against criminal defendants that would be excluded if it were offered by criminal defendants or
civil plaintiffs, some people thought this suggestion was "cynical." For evidence in support of this
"cynical" view, see 22 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 6, § 5168.1 (Supp. 2001).
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